CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-

SENTENCING-

OBJECTIVE CRITERIA MUST

BE USED IN EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY OF SENTENCE-Solem

v.

Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
The scope and applicability of the eighth amendment's' proscription of "cruel and unusual punishment" has been an area of continuing controversy. 2 One facet of eighth amendment protection concerns
the proportionality 3 of punishments to crimes. Recently, in Solem v.
Helm, 4 the United States Supreme Court narrowly extended the
boundaries of proportionality analysis and indicated avenues of future
development. The Court found that objective factors must be used to
evaluate the constitutionality of a given sentence, including one for a
term of years, because no penalty is per se unconstitutional.,
In 1979, Jerry Helm, a 39-year-old alcoholic 6 who had spent
most of his adult life in the South Dakota Penitentiary,7 pleaded guilty
to the felony offense of uttering a "no account" check for one hundred
dollars. 8 The maximum sentence for such an offense under South
Dakota's law at the time was a term of five years imprisonment and/or

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: *'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'" Id.
See, e.g., Clapp, Eighth Amendment Proportionality, 7 Am. J. CraM. L. 253 (1979):
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 839 (1969); Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1979); Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment:
An Historical Justificationfor the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).

1 See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
4 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
Id. at 3009-10.
6 Since Helm waived a pre-trial investigation, this fact never was conclusively established.
However, both the lower court and the Supreme Court referred to Helm's alcohol problem
several times, indicating that it figured heavily in all the offenses. See, e.g., id. at 3013 n.22;
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d 582
(8th Cir. 1982), afJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). Helm's own statement to the state trial court was
the strongest indication admitted into the record:
"Iwas working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that day, was drinking and I ended
up here in Rapid City with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd done
something I didn't know exactly what. If I would have known this, I would have
picked the check up. I was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several places."
Helm, 287 N.W.2d at 501 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
I State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 (S.D. 1980) (Morgan, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), afJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
S.D. CoDIIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2 (1979). The statute reads in relevant part:
Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another for present
consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial institution
knowing at the time of such passing that he or his principal does not have an account
with such financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
id.
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a fine of five thousand dollars. 9 Helm, having pleaded guilty to six
prior felony convictions,1 0 refused a pre-sentence investigation and
requested immediate sentencing."
The South Dakota Circuit Court had the option of sentencing
Helm under its recidivist statute,1 2 which provides that a defendant
convicted of at least three prior offenses in addition to the principal
felony for which he is being tried may have his sentence enhanced to
that of a Class 1 felony. Persons convicted of Class 1 felonies may be
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.13 Once this sentence is
imposed, they can be released only through gubernatorial commutation or pardon.' 4 The trial judge, concluding that Helm was "an
habitual criminal .

.

. beyond rehabilitation," chose to apply the

statute, and Helm then was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole. 15

1 S.D.

COMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1 (1967 & Supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 1980).
Helm was informed on three occasions that his guilty plea would trigger the habitual
offender statute, and that he could be sentenced to life imprisonment. Solem v. Helm, No. 82482 (S.D. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1981) (memorandum opinion denying application for habeas corpus).
The prior convictions consisted of three counts of third-degree burglary, obtaining money under
false pretenses, grand larceny, and a third offense of driving while intoxicated.
11 State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 498 (S.D. 1980), rev'd sub noma.Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d
582 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
12 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). Although it is within the
prosecutor's discretion to invoke this statute, in South Dakota the sentence is mandatory on
conviction. For a comprehensive breakdown of the recidivist laws which were in effect in 1980,
see Supplementary Brief for the Petitioner, table III, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
For a discussion of the range and constitutionality of these laws, see Katkin, Habitual Offender
Law: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes
Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REV. 356
(1975); see also infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
'1 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-15-4 (1979). The section reads: "A person sentenced to life
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." Id.
1, S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Commutation is not equivalent to pardon; rather, it is the
substitution of a lesser punishment for the one originally imposed. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
254 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Under the South Dakota statute, the Governor may authorize the board
to hear applications for parole, and to make its recommendations to him. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 24-14-1 (1979). He is not, however, bound by those recommendations. Id. § 24-14-5.
Twenty-two prisoners serving life terms in the South Dakota Penitentiary had their sentences
commuted between 1964-1975; not a single life sentence was commuted after 1975. Solem v.
Helm, 684 F.2d 582, 585 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
'5 The trial judge's full explanation for invoking the statute was as follows:
Well, I guess most anybody looking at this record would have to acknowledge that
you have a serious problem, if. . . your prior imprisonments have not had any effect
on . . . motivating you for change. If you get out in the near future, you're going to
be committing further crimes, so I can't see any purpose in my extending any
leniency to you at all here and I intend to give you a life sentence. It will be up to you
and the parole board to work out when you finally get out, but I think you certainly
earned this and certainly have proven that you're an habitual criminal and the
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that the only prudent
10
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Helm appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, contending that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. A
divided court affirmed the judgment, holding that the sentence was
constitutional.16 After serving two years in the penitentiary, and having requested commutation without success,' 7 Helm petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in South Dakota.' 8 He
again invoked the eighth amendment, and argued further that the
sentencing procedure, without a pre-sentence investigation, had violated his right to due process by imposing the maximum sentence upon
him. 19 The district court denied the request, ruling that Helm had
waived his right to a hearing and that the recent holding of Rummel
2
v. Estelle20 precluded his eighth amendment claim. '
Helm appealed the district court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 22 After reviewing the evidence, the panel
2
reversed the lower court and remanded Helm's case for resentencing. 1
The Eighth Circuit pointed out that the absence of any possibility of
parole distinguished Helm from other recidivist cases that raised
eighth amendment claims.2 4 The court of appeals found that life
imprisonment without parole was analogous to the death penalty
because both totally reject rehabilitation as a basic goal of the criminal justice system .25 The court considered the proportionality of such a
sentence to the underlying offense for which it was imposed and
determined that Helm's sentence was unconstitutional. 26 The Eighth

thing to do is to lock you up for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have
further victims of your crimes.. . . You'll have plenty of time to think this one over.
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Parker, J.,
S.D. Circuit Court, 7th Cir. Pennington County), rev'd sub nom. Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d 582
(8th Cir. 1982), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
The court of appeals, noting the sentencing judge's reference to the parole board, questioned
whether he had simply misread the statute, or whether he considered the board's role in making
nonbinding recommendations a primary one. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 583 n.3 (8th Cir.
1982), afJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
"8State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 498 (S.D. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d
582 (8th Cir. 1982), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). Three justices affirmed and two dissented.
11 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3002.
11 Id. at 3006.
19 Brief for Respondent, Solem v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1980).
2o 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
21 Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 (Oct. 1, 1982) (supplemental appendix).
22 Solem v. Helm, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), ajf'd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). The case was
decided by a four-judge panel and the decision was unanimous.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 584.
5' Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
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Circuit directed that a writ be issued if, within sixty days, the trial
27
court had not resentenced Helm.
The State of South Dakota petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. By a narrow majority, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, 28 holding that the
length of Helm's sentence was not in proportion to his crime, and thus
29
violated the eighth amendment.
The eighth amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishment" can be traced to an almost identically worded provision of
the English Declaration of Right of 1689.30 The principle which it
enunciates, however, antedates the English document. Before 1689, a
number of American colonial charters provided that punishment be
neither excessive nor cruel. 31 The Magna Carta and the Laws of
Edward the Confessor also invoke this concept. 32 Even the ancient

Id. at 587.
28 Five justices affirmed; four dissented. The majority opinion was written by Justice Powell,
who was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented. See infra note 119.
29 103 S. Ct. at 3001.
30 Section 10 of the Declaration of Right reads: "That excessive Baile ought not to be required
not excessive Fines imposed not cruell or unusuall Punishments inflicted." SOURCES OF OUR
LIBRTIES 245-47 (R. Perry ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as R. PERRY]. Other commentators
discussing the connection between the eighth amendment and the Declaration of Right include:
D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 316-17 (1975); Clapp, supra note 2, at
256; Granucci, supra note 2, at 852-64; Mulligan, supra note 2, at 640; Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 635, 636
(1966). But see Note, supra note 2, at 783 in which the authors argue that, while the English
influence cannot be discounted, the real philosophical progenitors of the amendment are the
French philosophers Voltaire and Montesquieu, and the Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria.
Until recently most scholars believed that the Declaration of Right was designed to prevent
certain forms of punishment, such as disembowelment, beheading, and quartering that James II
meted out in 1685 at the "Bloody Assize," the famous treason trial which followed the abortive
rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 2, at 640. But see Granucci,
supra note 2, at 850, 859 (impetus for enactment came from punishment of Titus Oates, minister
of the Church of England whose perjury conviction resulted in sentence of life imprisonment,
accompanied by defrocking, pilloring, whipping, and other indignities).
The source of the Act casts light on its meaning. The Framers of the United States Constitution, taking the "Bloody Assize" as the reason for the Declaration, understood the clause "cruel
and unusual punishment" to refer only to the method of punishment. Granucci, supra note 2, at
860. Granucci argues that the Framers misunderstood the import of the Act. He claims that
because it was based on the Oates trial, it was meant to prevent not only torture, but any penalty
that was excessive, unauthorized, or not within the jurisdiction of the court to impose. Id. at 859.
31 Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 425 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting R. PERY, supra note 30,
at 107). For example, The Massachusetts Body of Liberties, drafted in 1641 stated that " '[f]or
bodilie punishments we allow amongst us none that are inhumane Barbarous or cruel,' "while
the Charter of Rhode Island (1663) permitted " 'the imposing of lawfull and reasonable ffynes,
mulcts, imprisonments .... I " Id.
32 Granucci, supra note 2, at 846. Chapter 14 of the Magna Carta provides that " '[a] free
man shall not be amerced for a trivial offense, except in accordance with the degree of the
27

1008

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1004

Biblical precept of lex talionis, equal or equivalent punishment, has
33
been viewed as the historical basis of the amendment.
The original intent of the English Declaration of Right is ambiguous. 34 It is clear, however, that one hundred years later the Framers of
the Constitution understood the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" to mean barbarous forms of punishment rather than sentences
of excessive duration.3 5 That torture had fallen into disuse by this time
may explain why the eighth amendment was dormant for the first
century of the nations's history. 36 In its early decisions, the Supreme
Court determined whether a challenged sentence was unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual" by examining only the mode, and not the
length, of the punishment. 37 This construction robbed the amendment
of any real force, and severely limited its applicability. 38

offense; for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity.
Id. at 844
(quoting J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965)).
The Laws of Edward the Confessor, a 14th century document, applies the prohibition of
excessiveness to physical as well as monetary punishment: "We do forbid that a person shall be
condemned to death for a trifling offense. But for the correction of the multitude, extreme
punishment shall be inflicted according to the nature and extent of the offense." Id. (quoting B.
BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 181, 199 (1900)).
11 The biblical principle of lex talionis limited punishment to that which was identical to the
offense. The best known example of an identical talion, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,"
occurs in slightly different forms in Exodus 21:23-24 and Leviticus 24:19-20. Other expressions of
the concept can be found in Genesis 9:6 and Deuteronomy 19:19.
2 See supra note 30.
'5 See Clapp, supra note 2, at 256-57; Mulligan, supra note 2, at 642. Granucci, supra note
2, at 860, argues that this was a misunderstanding on the part of the Framers.
" Hobbs v. State, 13 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893) (primitive forms of
punishment no longer inflicted and hence eighth amendment obsolete).
" The Supreme Court directly addressed the eighth amendment for the first time in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), in which the Court refused to find that execution by shooting
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment." The Court found that, although the parameters of
the eighth amendment were difficult to define with precision, it was "safe to affirm" that its sole
purpose was to prohibit punishments that involved unnecessary cruelty. Id. at 135-36. As
illustrative examples of punishments which would contravene the eighth amendment, the Court
enumerated public dissection, beheading, and burning alive. Id. The Wilkerson Court, in
finding that death by shooting was not cruel or unusual, pointed to similar practices used in the
military and in other countries. Id. at 134.
Eleven years later, in the case of In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), the Court similarly
construed the eighth amendment in evaluating a new form of execution, electrocution. Referring
to the English Declaration of Right as its authority, the Kemmler Court explicitly stated that the
death penalty per se was not open to challenge. "Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that
word as used in the Constitution. It implies . . something more than the mere extinguishment
of life." Id. at 446-47. Later, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court would limit
the use of the death penalty. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
38 See supra note 37.
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There was an early indication, however, that a more expansive
interpretation was possible.39 In the landmark case of Weems v.
United States,40 the Court first confronted the question of whether, in
addition to forbidding harsh forms of punishment, the eighth amendment also required courts to proportion the penalty to the nature of
the crime. Weems, a disbursing officer for the Coast Guard in Manila,
was convicted of falsifying official records. 4' The sentence imposed
was a minimum of twelve years imprisonment in chains at hard labor,
along with the loss of parental, marital, and property rights during
imprisonment, the permanent loss of political rights, and the forfeiture of retirement pay. 42 Weems also was required to pay a large fine,
43
and to submit to official surveillance for the rest of his life.
The Weems Court described the sentence as "cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment
[and] unusual in its character." The Court went on to note that "[i]ts
punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both
on account of their degree and their kind.- 44 In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied a comparative approach which weighed
Weems' sentence against sentences imposed in other American jurisdictions for crimes which the Court regarded as at least as serious as
the one under scrutiny. 45 Finally, the Court found that the meaning of

11In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), a proportionality concept was enunciated in
connection with the eighth amendment for the first time. The defendant was convicted of 307
sales of liquor without a license. Id. at 327. Because he was unable to pay the required fine, he
was sentenced to 54 years imprisonment-three days imprisonment for each dollar owed. He
appealed on the grounds that this penalty was so excessive that it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. The Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds and therefore never
reached the constitutional issue. Id. at 334-35. The Court also stated that the eighth amendment
does not apply to the states. Id. at 442. It was not until Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), that incorporation formally took place. See infra note 76.
In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Field found the punishment "cruel and unusual"
within the meaning of the Constitution. ONeil, 144 U.S. at 339. Conceding that its original
intent was to prohibit torturous forms of punishment, Justice Field found that the scope of the
amendment was broad enough to encompass punishments that were excessive or disproportionate to the offense. Id. at 339-40.
-- 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The case was argued before seven justices. Justices White and Holmes
dissented.
41 Id. at 357-58.
42 Id. at 364.
11 Id. at 364-65. Weems was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and a fine of 4000 pesos,
both elements well within statutory limits.
" Id. at 377. The Court found the statute was per se unconstitutional, since even the
minimum sentence it mandated constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 382.
41 Id. at 380. The Court compared Weems' crime to forgery, robbery, larceny, misprison of
treason, inciting rebellion, and conspiracy to overturn the government by force, and found them
all to carry lesser penalties than he had received.

1010

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1004

the eighth amendment was not static, but must be constantly reinter46
preted and adapted to meet the changing conditions.
The scope of the holding in Weems has been a matter of great
debate. 47 The circuit courts have generally adopted a broad interpretation of Weems, thereby incorporating into the eighth amendment
the precept that the punishment must be proportionate to the crime.
For example, in the 1970 decision of Ralph v. Warden, 48 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invoked the eighth amendment to
overturn the death sentence of a defendant convicted of rape. 49 Relying on Weems, the court did not find that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual punishment per se, but held that its disproportion to a

41 Id. at 372-73 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (Fields, J., dissenting)). The
O'Neil dissent stated:
It must have come to [the Framers of the Constitution] that there could be exercises
of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily harm or mutilation ...
[The eighth amendment's] general language should not, therefore, be necessarily
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Times works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
true of constitutions.
Weems, 217 U.S. at 372-73.
47 Justice White, dissenting in Weems, unequivocally regarded the majority opinion as a
proportionality analysis. Weems, 217 U.S. at 385 (White, J., dissenting). He characterized it as
"an interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment, never
before announced..." and concluded that such interpretation imposes on the legislature "the
duty of proportioning punishment according to the nature of the crime, and casts upon the
judiciary the duty of determining whether punishments have been properly apportioned in a
... Id. It was on this basis that he refused to support the decision. Id.
particular statute.
Legal commentators are also divided in their evaluation of Weems. For the view that the
Weems Court identified proportionality as an essential component of the eighth amendment
guarantee, see Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment:
Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DuKE L.J. 1103, 1113-14 (1980)
("[In Weems] the Court broadened its prior eighth amendment analysis..."); Wheeler, Toward
a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv.
838, 839 (1972) ("[I]n Weems v. United States the United States Supreme Court rejected [a]
narrow interpretation").
The more conservative approach regards Weems as simply another instance of an impermissible form of punishment. See Mulligan, supra note 2, at 643 ("While the language of Weems
arguably does support the doctrine of proportionality . . . [it] is difficult . . . to believe that the
Supreme Court would have held a fifteen year term of imprisonment unconstitutional had it not
been for the barbarous terms which had accompanied and, indeed, followed its service.");
Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1075 (1964) ("The case is
much closer to the conventional view that cruel and unusual punishment is a matter of mode not
proportion than it is usually thought to be.").
Is 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970). The fact pattern is similar to that of Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977), decided several years later in much the same way. Both cases involved a death
penalty for rape.
4' Ralph, 438 F.2d at 787.
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specific offense could violate the eighth amendment. 50 In 1973, the
Fourth Circuit refined this analysis in Hart v. Coiner,5' a case which
is factually analogous to Helm, 52 and held that a mandatory life
sentence as applied to a nonviolent habitual offender was unconstitutionally disproportionate. 53 The Hart court used four "objective criteria" to reach its verdict: (1) an interjurisdictional comparison; (2) a
"nature of the offense" test similar to that used in Weems; (3) a
comparison of sentences levied for other felony offenses in the state;
and (4) a search for a significantly less severe punishment sufficient to
serve the legislative purpose underlying the penalty. 54 Five years later,
in Carmona v. Ward, 55 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals referred
to proportionality analysis as an established procedure used by circuit
courts in evaluating eighth amendment questions. 56 Although the Car-

o In weighing the nature of the crime, the court held that the fact that the rapist in this case
neither took nor endangered the life of his victim should be considered. Id. at 783. The court also
noted that two-thirds of the states and the majority of foreign nations did not punish rape with
death. Id. at 791-92. Even in those states whose criminal codes permit execution in rape cases,
the court found that it was infrequently applied. This was especially true where there were no
aggravating circumstances accompanying the crime. Id. at 792-93. The court found these facts
all spoke to the progressing standards of society by which eighth amendment requirements must
be evaluated. Id. at 790-91; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
51 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973).
-2 In Hart, the defendant received a mandatory life sentence under West Virginia's habitual
offender statute, W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977), which does not differentiate between violent
and nonviolent crimes. Hart, 483 F.2d at 138. Hart's three offenses were: 1) writing a check on
insufficient funds for $50; 2) transporting forged checks in the amount of $140 across state lines;
and 3) perjury in a murder trial in which his son was the defendant. Id. at 138. The court noted
that had the bad check which Hart passed in his first offense been for one penny less, it would not
have been classified as a felony, and, as a result, the maximum sentence that Hart could have
received following the perjury conviction would have been a possible five year enhancement of a
one to 10 year term of imprisonment. Id. at 138 n.1.
53 Hart, 483 F.2d at 136.
54 Id. at 140-42. Applying the same four criteria, the Sixth Circuit in Downey v. Perini, 518
F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 993 (1976), carried the process one
step further and invalidated the state's statute. The defendant had been sentenced to terms of
from 10 to 20 years in prison for possession of marijuana, and from 20 to 40 years in prison for its
sale. Downey, 518 F.2d at 1288-89. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had never found a
penalty cruel and unusual solely because of its length, the court nevertheless found the mandated
penalties so excessive that the statute violated the eighth amendment. Id. at 1292. The Downey
court reasoned that the fact that the Supreme Court had, on occasion, considered length-ofsentence cases on their merits implied that the possibility of an unconstitutionally long sentence
existed. Id. at 1290; see also Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 801 (1947) ("long-term imprisonment could be so disproportionate to the offense as to
fall within the inhibition [of the eighth amendment]").
55 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979).
-1 Id. at 409.
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mona court upheld sentences of four and six years to life for two
hardened and unrepentant drug pushers, it "accepted the proposition
that in some extraordinary cases a severe sentence imposed for a minor
offense could, solely because of its length, be a cruel and unusual
5
punishment."
State courts also interpreted Weems to mean that the length of a
sentence, as well as its form, had to be proportionate to the crime in
order to conform with eighth amendment standards. For example, in
1952, in State v. Evans, 58 the Supreme Court of Idaho found no
difficulty in invalidating a statute which permitted life imprisonment
for lewd behavior towards a minor. 59 Similarly, in People v. Lorentzen,6 0 the Supreme Court of Michigan, relying on its evaluation of
Weems, concluded that a prison term of twenty years was impermissibly disproportionate to a first offense of selling marijuana. The
Lorentzen court reached this finding by employing a refined, threetiered version of the comparative test used in Weems."'
In contrast to the state and circuit courts, the Supreme Court of
the United States has consistently read the Weems decision narrowly,
and therefore has refused to apply a proportionality analysis to those
eighth amendment challenges which it has reviewed. For example, in
1911, only one year after Weems, the Court in Graham v. West
Virginia6 2 upheld a mandatory life sentence imposed upon a threetime horse thief. 63 Weems was further circumscribed by the 1916
decision of Badders v. United States 4 in which the Court rejected the
petitioner's argument that concurrent sentences could be so dispropor-

57 Id. The court acknowledged that it could not find a Supreme Court decision to support its
contention, and put great emphasis on the deference which the judiciary should give to the
wisdom of the legislature. Id. at 416. In his dissent, Justice Oakes expounded the proportionality
principle and its application in a careful and detailed manner. Id. at 420-25 (Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
1 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952).
-9 Id. at 55, 245 P.2d at 792. The court applied the state constitutional provision forbidding
cruel and unusual punishment. IOAHO CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1890).
10 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
" First, the court compared the sentence at issue with other penalties imposed under
Michigan statutes for similar or more serious crimes. Id. at 173-79, 194 N.W.2d at 834. Second,
it surveyed other jurisdictions to determine what was generally considered appropriate punishment for this offense. Id. at 179, 194 N.W.2d at 832. Finally, it considered whether a lesser
punishment could accomplish the same goal. Id. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833; see also In re
Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (comparative analysis used to find
indeterminate sentence for second offense of indecent exposure offensive to state constitutional
provision forbidding cruel and unusual punishment).
.2 224 U.S. 616 (1911).
63 Id. at 631.
240 U.S. 391 (1916).
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tionately long as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.6 5 Without discussing Weems at all, the Court disposed of the constitutional
issue by citing Howard v. Fleming,6 a pre-Weems case as its authority. That case, which had involved a conspiracy to defraud, rejected
the kind of comparative analysis that the Weems Court had used to
7
reach its findings of disproportionality.
There were a number of instances, nevertheless, in which the
Supreme Court did invalidate sentences under the eighth amendment
in the period between the Weems and Helm decisions. The Supreme
Court's approach was significantly different, however, from that of
the state and circuit courts during the same time period. Generally,
the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court fell into one of two categories: cases which did not recognize a proportionality issue at all but
instead focused on the nature of the punishment,6 8 or those involving
the death penalty.6 9
In Trop v. Dulles,7 ° an example of the first category of cases, the
Supreme Court struck down a sentence because the form of the punishment, rather than its disproportionality to the crime, violated the
eighth amendment. 7 ' Trop, a former private in the United States
Army who had been court-martialled for a minor infraction, was
65 Id. at 393. Justice Holmes, who dissented in Weems, wrote the majority opinion in
Badders. In Badders, the defendant had posted seven letters to promote a fraudulent scheme.
The Court considered the deposit of each letter a separate offense and imposed a cumulative
sentence of five years imprisonment and $7000. id.
Courts consistently have found the aggregate weight of consecutive sentences constitutional.
As long as the sentence for a single offense was deemed within reasonable statutory limits, the
cumulative effect of multiple penalties does not bring it within the proscription of the eighth
amendment. See, e.g., Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1964) (consecutive
sentences totalling 40 years for marijuana sales not cruel and unusual); Smith v. United States,
273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959) (52 years imprisonment and $30,000 in fines not excessive for 14
violations of narcotics law for first time offender). cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960); United
States ex rel. Darrah v. Brierley, 290 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (50-100 years imprisonment)
for five consecutive sentences for burglary not -arbitrary and shocking to our sense of justice"
and therefore constitutional), aJJ'd, 415 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1969).
66 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
"7 Id. at 135-36. Rejecting the defendant's attempt to compare his sentence with others

imposed in North Carolina, the Howard Court said: "That for other offenses, which may be
considered by most, if not all, of a more grievous character, less punishments have been inflicted
does not make this sentence cruel. Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable
punishment in another to a cruel one." Id.
68 See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
69 See infra notes 77-97 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether, in evaluating the
death penalty, the Court applied a proportionality measure or simply viewed the death penalty
as a form of punishment which was proscribed in certain circumstances.
70 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
71 Trop was the first modern case in which the Court found any punishment to be in
violation of the eighth amendment.
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sentenced to three years imprisonment at hard labor and given a
dishonorable discharge. 7 2 Trop was later informed that, because of his
wartime conviction, he had been deprived of his United States citizenship. 73 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, expressly rejected
any implication that denaturalization was unconstitutional because it
was disproportionate to Trop's offense, emphasizing that wartime
desertion is often punishable by death.74 Rather, the Trop Court's
concern was limited to the form of the penalty, and the majority
found that denaturalization was an inherently cruel form of punishment. 75 Trop was therefore consistent with the Court's previous narrow construction of the eighth amendment which proscribed only
certain forms of punishment. In dicta, however, Justice Warren implied that a more far-reaching analysis was possible, stating that
"[t]he words of the [eighth] amendment are not precise and . . . their
scope is not static. The amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
76
society."
In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,7 7 did use an
eighth amendment proportionality analysis to invalidate a number of
state death penalty statutes. Five justices concurred in finding the
death penalties under consideration invalid, but only Justices Brennan
and Marshall focused on the substantive meaning of the eighth
amendment and used a comparative approach to find the death penId. at 88.
Id. at 103.
74 Id. at 99. Justice Frankfurter made this point explicitly in his dissent.
It seems scarcely arguable that loss of citizenship is within the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition because disproportionate to an offense that is capital and has been so
from the first year of Independence. . . . Is constitutional dialectic so empty of
reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than
death?
Id. at 125 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 101. "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There
is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of
punishment more primitive than torture ..
" Id.
76 Id. at 100-01 (footnote omitted). The Court heard another eighth amendment case in
1962. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), a narcotics addict was convicted and
sentenced to 90 days imprisonment under a California statute which made it a criminal offense
for a person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." CALIFORNIA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1172
(1979). The Court expressly incorporated federal standards of cruel and unusual punishment into
state law through the due process clause of the 14th amendment, Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666, and
invalidated the sentence. It is not clear whether it did so because it found the sentence disproportionate to the offense, or because it viewed imprisonment as a cruel mode of punishing an addict.
Justice Stewart seemed to imply that it was unconstitutional to impose any criminal sanction on
someone who was ill or subject to an uncontrollable addiction. Id. at 667.
17 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
71
71
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alties excessive and disproportionate.7" Justice Brennan concluded
that, to conform to the requirements of the eighth amendment, a
punishment: 1) cannot by its severity or form be degrading to human
dignity; 79 2) must not be arbitrarily or capriciously inflicted;8 0 3) must
be in keeping with contemporary societal standards; 8' and 4) cannot
82
be clearly in excess of what is needed to achieve legislative goals.
Justice Marshall, adopting a similar test, found that the eighth
amendment precluded execution as a means of punishment under any
circumstances.8 3 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist dissented separately, 84 arguing that the concept of
separation of powers required judicial deference to legislative prerogatives, and that the Court could therefore invalidate only inherently
cruel punishments.8 5 Justice Powell emphasized that all other factors,
such as the proportion of the crime to the penalty, were solely within
the purview of the legislature and thus beyond the scope of the eighth
86
amendment and of the Court's authority.
Following Furman, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
administration of a proportionality standard within the context of

11Id. at 240. Three of the justices reached their verdict largely on procedural grounds,
determining that the death penalties in this case were cruel and unusual because they were
administered in an arbitrary, inequitable, or discriminatory fashion. Id. at 240-47 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring). This
kind of determination is consistent with the Court's traditional focus on form rather than on
proportion.
71 Id. at 244-50 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 314
(White, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 281.
81

Id.

11 Id. at 280. "Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be
grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the more significant basis is that
the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment." Id. For
further discussion of this requirement, sometimes referred to as "the least drastic alternative"
test, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637
(1969). See also Singer, Sending Men to Prison: ConstitutionalAspects of the Burden of Proof
and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 51 (1972).
83 Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
84 Justice Rehnquist later characterized the Furman decision as "glossolalial,"
a term which
connotes a fabricated, nonmeaningful speech, especially as associated with certain schizophrenic
syndromes. WEBSTER's DIMrONARY 595 (2d College ed. 1980); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428

U.S. 280, 317 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Judge Clark of the California court, in no less
critical a tone, stated that "[w]here it not a matter of life or death, the entire affair would assume
the character of a comedy of errors." Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 437, 556 P.2d
1101, 1118, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 657 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring).
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 383-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 431-33 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 467-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Il Id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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death penalty cases.8 7 In the 1976 decision of Gregg v. Georgia,8 the
Court held that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual per se, 89 as
long as it is subject to a number of procedural safeguards, including
an examination of the nature of the offense in question, in order to
determine if the penalty imposed is excessive.9 0
Only a year later, in Coker v. Georgia,9 1 the Court reversed a
sentence of death for a convicted rapist on the explicitly stated ground
that the punishment was disproportionate to the crime. 92 Although
the Court agreed that the crime itself, the rape of an adult woman,
was a heinous offense, it noted that no life had been taken. 93 Comparing the sentence to others within the same jurisdiction, the majority
observed that Georgia usually reserved the death penalty for prisoners
convicted of either murder with malice aforethought or felony murder.9 4 The Court also made an interjurisdictional investigation and
found that only two other states authorized a death penalty for the
rape of an adult. 5 Finally, the Court indicated that evolving social
standards were revealed by a showing that a vast majority of juries
had refused to impose a death sentence in any but the most extreme
cases of rape.9 6 On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that
nothing toward
execution for rape was excessive and contributed
97
achieving the acceptable goals of punishment.
In 1980, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to extend its
incipient proportionality analysis to a noncapital case,9 8 but refused to

87 See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976). Both these decisions struck down mandatory death penalties.
8 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
89 Id. at 178. Justice Marshall dissented, reaffirming his position that the death penalty was
unconstitutional in any circumstance. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 173. The inquiry required consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in a
bifurcated proceeding. Id. at 188-95.
Of 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
92 Id. at 592.
13 Id. at 598.
11 Id. at 600.
11 Id. at 594-95. Three others would execute a rapist when the victim was a child. Id.
96 Id. at 597.
97 Id. at 592. Justice Powell concurred with the judgment of the Court in this case, but did
not want to foreclose the possibility of a death penalty in all cases of rape. Id. at 603 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justices Marshall and Brennan concurred, but would find
all death penalties unconstitutional. Id. at 600 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist and
Burger dissented, and would leave the sentence entirely within the discretion of the legislature.
Id. at 610-11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
11 In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1972), for example, Justice Black stated the
controlling attitude explicitly. Concurring with the ruling that the petitioner had not been
denied any constitutional rights, Justice Black reiterated that the eighth amendement was

1984

NOTES

1017

do so. In Rummel v. Estelle,99 the Court upheld a life sentence imposed on a recidivist. 00 William Rummel was a petty thief who had
been convicted of three nonviolent felonies. 10 Texas law provided
that anyone convicted of three felonies, regardless of their nature, was
subject to its habitual offender statute. 0 2 As a result, Rummel was
sentenced to life imprisonment. 10 3 Rummel challenged the sentence,
contending that in view of the underlying offense, its length rendered
10 4
it cruel and unusual.
Rummel relied on the decision in Weems, arguing that the length
of Weems' imprisonment was the basis of the Court's finding of cruel
and unusual punishment in that case. 105 The Court found, however,
that Weems spoke only to unorthodox, not excessively long penalties. 10 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, drew a "bright line"
between the death penalty and all other forms of punishment, 0 7 and
cautioned that prior opinions therefore would be of "limited assistance" in evaluating sentences for terms of years. 0 8 The Court also
rejected the use of comparative or proportional analyses as inapposite
to noncapital cases.' 0 9 Finally, the Court ruled that, in light of Rummel's eligibility for parole, the sentence should realistically be viewed

forms of punishment which the Framers intended to eliminate, and indicated that any other
interpretation would constitute a judicial revision of the Constitution. Id. at 226 (opinion of
Black, J.).
9- 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
1o0Id. at 266-67.
,01 Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1978), aif'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Rummel's first conviction resulted from the fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00
worth of goods. His second conviction was for passing a bad check in the amount of $28.36. His
third felony conviction was for obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. Id.
102 Id. Rummel was convicted under TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) which
states, in pertinent part: "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than
capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." Id.
013Id. at 266.
04 Id. at 267.
105 Id. at 273.
106 Id. at 273-74.
107 Id. The Court, emphasizing the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of eighth
amendment analysis, quoted Justice Stewart's opinion in Furman:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection
of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of
humanity.
Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 306).
1o8Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
109 Id.
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as one for less than life imprisonment." 0 The Court expressed concern
that any further evaluation of the offense in question would encroach
improperly on the province of the legislature."'
In the wake of Rummel, some courts felt bound to expunge
proportionality considerations from the eighth amendment, except
with regard to some death penalty cases." 2 Other courts devised
inventive interpretations of Rummel which allowed them to continue
to scrutinize noncapital sentences. For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a punishment could be cruel and unusual
by reason of disproportion, as long as it was more disproportionate
than Rummel's had been." 3 Finally, the Fifth Circuit, in Terrebonne
v. Blackburn," 4 in the course of upholding a life sentence for distributing heroin, implied that Rummel had not foreclosed the use of
proportionality in nondeath cases. The court of appeals reasoned that,
by weighing the effect of parole on the sentence, the Rummel Court
had focused on the length of the sentence and had thus, in effect,
made its own proportionality analysis." 5 According to Terrebonne,
because the Rummel Court had not adopted the position that the
legislature has absolute discretion, the decision implied that some
judicial review of individual sentences was still possible." 6
That possibility became a reality just two years later when, in
Solem v. Helm," 7 the Supreme Court unexpectedly reversed its prior
course and overturned a sentence of life imprisonment imposed under
110Id. at 281. The majority asserted that "a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of Rummel
could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life."
Id.
III The Court dismissed the argument that Rummel's offenses were nonviolent with two
counterarguments: first, that the "pettiness" of the crime is no measure of the strength of society's
interest in deterring it, id. at 276; and second, that the offense for which Rummel was being
given a life sentence was not the theft of $120, but his recidivism (i.e., his propensity for crime).
Id. at 284. Both interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional comparisons were rejected as contrary
to concepts of federalism and legislative prerogative. Id. at 282, 284.
112 See, e.g., Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967 (C.D. I11. 1980) (interprets Rummel to
exclude judicial intervention in noncapital proportionality cases); State v. Smith, 275 S.C. 164,
268 S.E.2d 276 (1980).
113 Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1980). The court let the sentence stand
in this case because it found no "gross disproportionality." Id. In State v. McDaniel, 228 Kan.
172, 612 P.2d 1231 (1980), a Kansas court took a different approach. It stated that a court was
"not required" by Rummel to make a proportionality test under the eighth amendment, but
implied that it was free to do so. Id. at 1242 (emphasis in original). The Kansas court proceeded
to do just that, although it found the sentence in question valid.
" 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981).
115 Id. at 1002.
l16 Id. at 1001.
117 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). The fact patterns in Helm and Rummel were similar, see supra
notes 5-12 & 102-05 and accompanying text, with several variations, some minor and some
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a recidivist statute. 118 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 1 9 initially focused on the concept of proportionality and its constitutional
significance.12 0 Reviewing the historical development of the eighth
amendment, the Court maintained that, when the Framers adopted
the language of the English Bill of Rights prohibiting excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishment, they also were incorporating its
which the Court considered significant. See infra text accompanying note 142. Both defendants
were petty criminals, convicted under recidivist statutes.
118 Recidivist statutes have a long history in America. As early as 1692, the Massachusetts Bay
Colony enacted a law aimed at curbing a rash of hog thefts by providing for a more severe
penalty for each subsequent offense. Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime through
Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L. REV. 511 (1982). The rationale behind such laws was
enunciated clearly in the Gladstone Committee Report, presented to the House of Commons as
part of an effort at prison reform in 1895.
"There is evidently a large class of habitual criminals-who live by robbery and
thieving and petty larceny-who run the risk of comparatively short sentences with
comparative indifference. . . .When an offender has been convicted a fourth time
or more he or she is pretty sure to have taken to crime as a profession and sooner or
later to return to prison. We are, therefore, of opinion that further corrective
measures are desirable for these persons. . . .To punish them for the particular
offense is almost useless; the real offense is the willful persistence in the deliberately
acquired habit of crime.
Katkin, supra note 12, at 99-100 (quoting HousE OF COMMONS,

REPORT OF THE COMM.

ON

31 (1895)).
This same idea was expounded by the Rummel Court which stated explicitly that the defendant was being punished not only for his theft of $120, the crime which was the subject of the
trial, but for his underlying propensity for crime. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284; see infra text
accompanying note 180.
I'l The configuration of the Court was almost a mirror image of the Court in Rummel. Justice
Powell, who had written the dissent in Rummel, delivered the majority opinion in Helm. He was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun. All except Justice Blackmun had
been among the dissenters in Rummel. Chief Justice Burger filed the dissent in the present case.
He was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist (author of the plurality opinion in Rummel), and
O'Connor (who had joined the Court in the intervening period). Justice Stewart, who had
written an opinion in which he reluctantly concurred with the majority in Rummel, had retired
from the bench, making way for Justice O'Connor's appointment.
Justice Blackmun cast the deciding vote in Helm. Justice Blackmun's position on the Court has
shifted significantly since he was appointed in 1970. In seven cases involving an eighth amendment challenge decided between 1980 and 1983 (subsequent to Rummel but prior to Helm),
there was a clear division in the positions taken by Justices Brennan and Marshall on one hand,
and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist on the other. On six of the seven occasions,
Justice Blackmun aligned himself with the former group, although he often wrote a separate
opinion. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983); California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 336
(1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537
(1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
Only once during this period did Justice Blackmun clearly prefer the more conservative position.
See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). For an interesting study of Justice
Blackmun's voting record on social issues, see Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice
Blackmun, 96 HARv. L. REV. 715 (1983); see also Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
12O Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3006-10.
PRISONS
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2
underlying proportionality principle into their new Constitution.' 1
The Court further averred that proportionality had been an integral
part of constitutional analysis under the eighth amendment for almost
one hundred years. 1 22 Finally, the Court concluded that prison sentences were properly subject to proportionality analysis. 123 The Court
reasoned that this holding was the logical result of previous development 124 and that "[ilt would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject
to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.' 1 25 The Court admitted, however, that the
occasions for invalidating a sentence for a term of years because of its
26
disproportionality would be rare.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court next sought the standards by which to determine the proportionality of a given sentence to
a particular crime. For this purpose, it adopted the comparative
approach used in Weems and developed in subsequent cases. 1 27 In
enunciating its standard, the Court adopted three objective criteria:
the nature of the offense, the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions
28
for the same crime.1
This analysis formed the core of the Helm opinion. The Court
first evaluated the contours of the offense itself. 129 Recognizing the
difficulties inherent in weighing the gravity of different crimes, the
Court nevertheless indicated that it is not only possible to reach a
consensus on relative seriousness, but that it is one of the Court's

"I Id. at 3007. The Court reasoned that, since proportionality was clearly an integral part of
the English legal system, and since one recurrent theme of the revolutionary period was the
American desire for all the rights of English subjects, it would be anomolous if the Framers had
taken the words and not the content of the 1688 Bill of Rights. But see supra note 30 on the
disagreement among scholars concerning the precise meaning of the English provision, especially
as understood by the Framers.
122 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3007-08 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)); see
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); see also
supra notes 47-61. The Court also relied on several death penalty cases. See Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584; see also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 277 n.13 (conceding
some prison sentences may be unconstitutionally disproportionate).
123 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
124 The Court did not address Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982), in which it explicitly
found that a sentence for a term of years had never been invalidated solely because of its length.
125 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
126 The Court at this point also gave a deferential nod to the concept of legislative prerogative.
Id. at 3009 n.16.
121 See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 86; supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
128 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010.
129 Id.
at 3011.
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functions to do so. 1 30 Some of the elements aiding such a determination are the magnitude of the crime, the violence or threat of violence
it presents, the harm likely to follow, and the culpability of the
offender. 1 3 1 On the basis of all these considerations, the Court held
that Helm's crime was a minor one-a property offense which threatened no violence and involved only a small sum. 32 The Court acknowledged .that Helm was being punished not only for his latest
offense, but also for his recidivism. 3 3 It held, however, that although
the state had the right to punish habitual offenders more severely than

Id.
Id.
I3
132 Id. at 3012-13. The Court pointed out that had Helm been convicted of embezzling or
stealing the same amount, or of writing a $100 check against insufficient funds, rather than
against a nonexistent account, he would have been guilty of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.
Id. at 3013 n.20.
133 Id. at 3013. Although there have been many challenges to recidivist laws, few have been
successful. The constitutionality of such statutes had been acknowledged generally in a number
of test cases. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U.S. 616 (1912); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895). Specifically, recidivist statutes have
survived challenges based on a variety of constitutional considerations: the due process clause of
the 14th amendment; see, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (due process does not require
advance notice of habitual criminal accusation); Ves v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446
(1964) (four-time offender not denied due process by indictment as habitual offender); Surrat v.
Commonwealth, 187 Va. 940, 48 S.E.2d 362 (1948) (introduction of evidence of former convictions not violative of due process); the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (equal protection considerations do not prevent state from
marking class of offenders for special treatment); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (state
may provide that persons previously convicted of crime suffer more severe punishment for
subsequent offense without violating equal protection clause of 14th amendment, provided only
that such added punishment meted out to all habitual offenders); double jeopardy, Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (enhanced penalty for fourth offense not new jeopardy or added
punishment for earlier crimes); ex post facto, Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N.E.
579 (1892) (recidivist statute not ex post facto as to convictions prior to its passage, since criminal
cannot be punished under it without conviction of felony after its passage and with presumed
knowledge of its provisions); Ves v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446 (1964) ("habitual
offender statutes are not ex post facto even where prior convictions occurred before effective date
of such statute"); and the cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment, Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1911) (life sentence for third felony not cruel and unusual punishment).
South Dakota's own recidivist statute, S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS §§ 22-7-8, -7-1(2) (1979) (amended
1981), was upheld in State v. Connor, 265 N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1978).
It is significant that neither Rummel nor Helm attacked the validity of such laws generally,
but only as applied to them under the circumstances. In at least two cases prior to Helm,
defendants have prevailed on this basis. See Hart, 483 F.2d at 136; see supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text; State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). Whether habitual
offender statutes on their face are entirely immune from future challenge is a question that has
been raised by a number of observers. See, e.g., Katkin, supra note 12, at 105; Note, The
Constitutionality of Statutes PermittingIncreased Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1975); Note, supra note 118, at 511; see also infra notes 174-91 and
accompanying text.
130
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others,13 4 that penalty could not be rendered in the abstract. 3 5 It was
also necessary to consider the nature of the prior offenses. Here, the
Court found that Helm's previous crimes were also relatively minor
36
and nonviolent.
Examining the penalties that South Dakota imposed for other
crimes, the Court found that only murder, treason, first degree manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping were punished with life
imprisonment. 37 Other dangerous and violent crimes, such as attempted murder, first degree rape, and aggravated riot, received
38
lesser sentences.

,34 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3013. As of 1984, all but five states, Maine, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Virginia, had recidivist statutes in effect. These statutes can be divided into four
main types: mandatory life, discretionary life, mandatory term, and discretionary term. Within
these categories, there are further divisions. For example, some states which mandate a life
sentence after the final felony impose it after the third felony. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 12.42 (Vernon 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18
(1977). Others require at least four previous felonies. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1978);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010(2) (1981): S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979 & Supp. 1982):
WYo. STAT. § 6-10-201 (1977). Still others prescribe that the defendant be convicted of at least
one violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, aggravated battery) before he is subject to life imprisonment under its recidivist law. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 33B (Smith-Hurd 1981); LA. CODE
CrM. PRoc. ANN. art. 15:529.1 (West 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (1976 & Supp.
1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL § 39-70.10 (McKinney Supp.
1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-801 (1982).
Discretionary life habitual offender statutes give the sentencing authority the option of punishing by life or a term of years. These, too, can be subdivided into those laws which impose the
penalty after any final felony, or only after the last violent one. Examples of the first type are
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 4214 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104 (Supp. 1979). Statutes which
come into effect only after a final violent felony include CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West
1972 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1983).
Recidivist statutes prescribing a term of years which is automatically imposed on the finding of
guilt include MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (West 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West
1982). Finally, examples of statutes which permit the sentencing authority to determine the
length of imprisonment, as long as it is less than life are IowA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1979).
There is also a recidivist law on the federal level. See Dangerous Special Offender Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3575 (b) (1971) (requiring prosecuting attorney classify offender as dangerous and
limiting enhanced sentence to 25 years). This proportionality provision is also part of the ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 18-3.3(a)(i) (1968) ("[a]ny
increased term which can be imposed because of prior criminality should be related in severity to
the sentence otherwise provided for the offense"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.03, 7.04
(1962) (provides for enhanced punishment for habitual offenders).
"3 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
ld. at 3012-13. The dissent disagreed vehemently with the characterization of Helm's prior
I36
offenses as "non-violent." It cited his three burglaries and drunk driving convictions as potentially violent, and said that, by comparison, Rummel was almost a "model citizen." Id. at 3017
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"I ld. at 3013-14.
Id. at 3014.
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Finally, applying the third prong of the analysis, the Court conducted an interjurisdictional survey and concluded that Helm could
have received a similar sentence only in Nevada.139 Moreover, there
was no evidence that a Nevada court, which unlike those of South
Dakota had the option of providing for parole, had ever actually
40
imposed a life sentence without parole on a nonviolent offender.
The Helm Court was careful to emphasize that it was not overruling Rummel.'14 It distinguished the two cases by comparing the
nature of Helm's punishment to that which the Court had imposed on
Rummel. The decision in Rummel had relied heavily on the availability of parole. Because the South Dakota statute precluded parole, the
42
Helm Court found the two sentences fundamentally different.
Weighing all the above criteria, the Court concluded that Helm's
sentence was significantly disproportionate to his crimes, and thus was
proscribed by the eighth amendment.t43
Chief Justice Burger wrote a strong dissent. He attacked the
majority for disregarding the concept of stare decisis by ignoring the
Court's recent ruling in Rummel.144 He challenged the majority's
interpretation of Weems 145 and its view of proportionality gener139 Id.
140

Id.

4' Id. at 3008-09 n.13.
142 Id. at 3015-16. Two questions are presented here: first, the role of parole in the penal
system, especially in the sentencing phase; and second, the difference between parole and
commutation. Authorities have differed as to whether the possibility of parole should be considered in passing sentence. Some courts consider it a factor in assessing the harshness of a particular
sentence. See Carmona, 576 F.2d at 413. Some assign it an even more fixed role in the process.
For example, in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). the Court posited that "[d]uring
the past 60 years, the practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences
had become an integral part of the penological system." See Wolff v, McDonnell, 418 U.S. 538
(1974) (interests of Nebraska prisoners in earlier parole eligibility was right protected by due
process). Other rulings have differed sharply. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court held that the possibility of parole does not
create a due process right to be conditionally released, but only creates a "'mere hope" of release
which cannot be relied upon in determining a just and proper sentence.
There has been greater consensus for viewing commutation as a peripheral and inconstant part
of the criminal process at best. For example, in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458 (1981), the Supreme Court held that since commutation, unlike parole, does not
depend on objective factfinding, but solely on subjective evaluations, it formed no fixed part of
the process. Id. at 464. Therefore, the Court continued, a prisoner's interest in commutation is
"simply a unilateral hope," not a right. Id. at 465. But see California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 336
(1983) (capital sentencing jury may consider governor's power to commute life sentence when
reaching verdict).
143 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3021.
144 Id. at 3017.
115Id. at 3018. Justice Burger restricted Weems to its bizarre penalty and emphasized that it
was this type of unique form of punishment that the Court had sought to prohibit. He quoted
from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rummel:
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ally.14 In support of his view, Chief Justice Burger also reviewed the
history of the proportionality analysis under the eighth amendment
and determined that it was not applicable outside the context of the
death penalty. 147 Most importantly, Chief Justice Burger categorically
rejected the majority's methodology. Referring to the plurality in
Rummel, the dissent found any attempt at a comparison of either
crimes or sentences invalid because it involved the kind of judicial
review that crossed the line which separates the powers.1 48 Justice
Burger characterized the majority's decision as an impermissible and
dangerous intrusion by the Court into an area properly left to legislative discretion, and cautioned that the result well might be confusion
and a flood of cases into the appellate courts.14
The Helm decision represents a significant departure from the
Supreme Court's prior interpretation of the eighth amendment by
establishing that the length of a prison sentence which is grossly
disproportionate to the crime may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 50 In extending the reach of the eighth amendment to cases
involving a term for years, Helm reinforced a strong line of circuit and
state court decisions,' 51 and gave due weight and meaning to the
judicial imperative for an evolving and progressive approach to constitutional interpretation. 15 Furthermore, in direct contradiction to
Rummel, the Helm Court adopted a comparative approach in deciding whether the sentence imposed was proprotionate to the crime that
had been committed. The Court considered: (1) the nature of Helm's
offense; (2) the types of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same

Given the unique nature of the punishment considered in Weems and in the death
penalty cases, one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of
the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added).
141 Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3017-18.
147 Id. Even this proposition has been eroded recently in Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871
(1984), in which the Court held that the eighth amendment did not require the court to conduct
a comparative proportionality analysis in every capital case.
148 Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3017-18.
149 Id.
1,50Id. at 3009. The Court discussed the concept of proportionality as it relates to the eighth
amendment and indicated that it always had embraced the concept that the "punishment should
be proportionate to the crime." Id. at 3005-06. Nevertheless, Helm represents the Supreme
Court's first application of this concept to the length of a sentence alone. Id. at 3007.
'51 See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. 153
The three-pronged test which the Helm Court selected provides a
rational and responsible method of determining proportionality. The
first factor which the court examined, the nature of the offense,
involved an evaluation of the harm caused or threatened by the
crime. 154 In gauging the offense, courts consider the character and
record of the individual offender,155 assess his moral culpability,156
and distinguish between crimes of violence and those which are nonviolent.1 57 The second part of the test entailed an intrajurisdictional
survey of crimes and punishments.158 Far from fettering legislative
action, such an approach recognizes the overall societal interests
which the state has demonstrated in its enactments, and merely uses
them as a guide to determine if the sentence in question is out of line
with the parameters which the state itself has set. 159 The final prong of

"I Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. In Rummel the Court rejected the first criterion, stating that
"the presence or absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest in
deterring a particular crime." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275. The Rummel majority did not undertake an intrajurisdictional analysis, but did explicitly reject any interjurisdictional comparison,
believing that "Texas is entitled to make its own judgment as to where [the line between felony
theft and petty larceny lies]." Id. at 284. The Rummel Court's essential objection was that any
line drawn by the Court concerning different sentences would involve the Court in "the basic
line-drawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the legislature." Id. at 275; see also
Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (drawing lines between different sentences
results in judgments which are "no more than the visceral reactions of individual Justices").
I' Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3012-13.
15 Id. at 3004-05.
158 Id.
157 Id. at 3012-13; see also Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.) (only violence is clear
enough ground on which to differentiate between crimes), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975).
The Helm dissent denied the validity of this distinction, citing Rummel to the effect that "the
absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest in deterring a
particular crime, or in punishing a particular individual." Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (citing
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275). Although it is true that certain crimes which are technically
characterized as nonviolent (such as narcotics offenses) can present problems which the state has
a special interest in preventing, it does not follow that the presence or absence of violence is
irrelevant in evaluating offenses in general. Id. at 3014 n.26; see also Note, Drug Abuse, Law
Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New York's 1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 638 (1975).
'5
Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3013-14.
159See In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
[Clomparison between punishments imposed for more serious crimes with the punishment in question is based upon the assumption that although isolated excessive
penalties may occasionally be enacted through honest zeal .. generated in response
to transitory public emotion, the vast majority of punishments may be deemed to
have been enacted with due regard for constitutional restraints.
Id. at 927, 519 P.2d at 1084, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 659-60
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the Helm test, an interjurisdictional comparison, allows the court to
examine how other states punish a particular offense.160 The rationale
behind this method rests in the conviction that a majority of jurisdictions will have enacted statutes which are constitutionally sound, and
that a consensus of the legislative judgments of sister states is the best
indication of current norms of decency.'"' Although used alone, an
interjurisdictional test might be suspect as "inimical to traditional
notions of federalism , ' 1 62 the three criteria used together do not impose uniformity on the states, but only seek to ascertain that the
63
punishment under review is within constitutional boundaries.
The narrowness of the Helm decision, however, both in terms of
the size of its plurality 6 4 and the ground on which it was distinguished
from Rummel, limits its usefulness as a basis for future eighth amendment challenges. Because of its failure to overrule Rummel, the
Court's decision in Helm can be confined to its facts. The only basis on
which the Court distinguished Helm from Rummel was on the issue of
parole: the statute under which Helm was convicted did not provide
for parole, while the applicable law in Rummel made parole available. 6 5 In making this the keystone of its decision, the Court seemed
merely to indicate that Helm's punishment was invalid because it was
even more disproportionate than Rummel's punishment

11oHelm, 103 S. Ct. at 3014.
"I1See Furman. 408 U.S. at 436-37 (Powell, J., dissenting): id. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Two other possible methods for assessing societal standards are to examine jury nullification
and public opinion polls. Public antipathy in applying a penalty is strong evidence that it no
longer conforms with contemporary mores. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 312
(1966). There is some disagreement about the value of public opinion polls. Professor Wheeler
feels that such surveys are useful because "the severity of punishments is subjective, measurable
only by ascertaining their effect upon individuals." Wheeler. Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 860 (1972).
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Furman. however, indicated that to be worthy of consideration.
public attitudes must be "informed." Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., Dissenting). In this
context he hypothesized that if the public were fully aware of the ramifications of the death
penalty, they would be against it. For an interesting study examining that theory see Sarat &
Vidmar, Public Opinion, The Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall
Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171. One court has also criticized reliance on public opinion as
investing the population with the power to make evaluations properly left to the judiciary. State
v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18, 28, 29 n. I (Mo. App. 1978). This is what Professor Packer criticized
in another context as "due process by headcount." Packer, supra note 47, at 1074.
162 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282; see Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"I3Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010 n.17 (noting "the inherent nature of our federal system and the
need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences").
J See supra note 119.
"s Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3015.
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had been. The logical inference, therefore, is that if Helm had been
entitled to parole his sentence would not have been unconstitutional. 166
The possibility of parole, however, is not a meaningful rationale
on which to predicate a determination of cruel and unusual punishment.16 7 Several courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have
noted that parole is not an enforceable expectation of any prisoner; 6 8
therefore, "to condition the lawfulness of a defendant's incarceration
. . . on the chance of a reduced sentence or parole would place a
decision of constitutional dimensions within the unreviewable discretion of correctional authorities.' 6 9 Therefore, if Helm is to stand for
more than its particular fact pattern,17 0 clarification and further
action by the Court is required.
There are several options open to the Court in the future. The
first option which the Court could pursue is to reexamine the constitutionality of the kind of recidivist statute used to sentence Helm. The
Helm majority made only a passing reference to South Dakota's habitual offender law: It did not question the validity of the statute itself,
but only its application to the individual defendant. '7 ' Because recidi-

"I This seemed to be the proposition which a Seventh Circuit court took from Heln. In
United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1983), the court, citing Helm, refused to find
unconstitutional a sentence of 210 years imprisonment for 39 counts of drug smuggling because
the defendant was eligible for parole in 10 years. Id. at 1341.
I'l The spuriousness of using parole as the basis of the decision is emphasized by the fact that
both those in the majority and those in the dissent seem to have reversed themselves on this issue.
The majority in Rummel had asserted that parole was a determining and pivotal factor.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279-80. These same justices, with the single exception of Justice Blackmun,
contended that its absence was not fatal in Helm. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3022. Conversely, the
dissent in Rummel, which had argued vigorously that parole was inapplicable to length of
sentence review, Rummel, 445 U.S. at 294, subsequently seemed to find it extremely relevant.
Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3013, 3015-16.
I'l See Helm, 103 S.Ct. at 3015; Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,
466 (1981); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 422 U.S. 1 (1979).
169See Note, Disproportionalityin Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1130
(1979).
"I The few cases that have cited Helm evince an uncertainty as to the breadth of its holding.
United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1983), cited it for the proposition that the
availability of parole is a crucial factor in determining proportionality. Commonwealth v.
Diatchenko, 387 Mass. 718, 443 N.E.2d 397 (1982), however, found that a sentence for life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Two cases, United States v. DeBright, 710 F.2d 1404, 1409 n.8 (1983) and People v. Dillon, 34
Cal. 3d 441, 478 n.25, 668 P.2d 697, 719 n.25, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 411-12 n.25 (1983), used
Helm to support the broader concept that the length of a sentence must be proportionate to the
offense if it is to pass constitutional muster.
"I Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3013 n.24.
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vist statutes have withstood constitutional scrutiny in the past, 172 the
wholesale invalidation of such laws would be the most radical, and
consequently, the most unlikely course for the Court to take. Many
commentators, nevertheless, feel that the time has come for a general
reevaluation and challenge of habitual offender laws both because
they fail to serve the legitimate goals of penology and because they
173
lack procedural standards.
The goals of penology traditionally have been divided into retri17 6
and rehabilitation. 7 7 Opbution,7 4 deterrence,17 5 incapacitation,
ponents of habitual offender statutes contend that enhancement of
sentences on the basis of recidivism does nothing to further these
goals.' 78 Retribution, for example, involves punishment only for the
offense committed, without reference to past or future conduct. I7 9
Recidivist laws, however, punish a defendant not only for his past
offenses, or even for the cumulative effect of such crimes, but for the
likelihood that he will commit future offenses-an evaluation that the

See supra note 133.
See, e.g., Katkin, supra note 12. For discussions of the philosophical underpinnings of
punishment. See generally Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law: Through the Looking Glass of
Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionalityand Justice as Endangered Doctrines. 34 Sw. L. REV. 1063,
1073-79 (1981); Radin, The jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1049-52 (1978).
14 The classic presentation of the doctrine of retribution is I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-102 (J. Ladd trans. 1965). But see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949) (retribution no longer dominant objective of criminal law).
175Bentham, Principlesof Penal Law, Pt. II, bk.1, ch.3, in J. BENTHAM'S WORKS 396, 402 (J.
17

171

Bowring ed. 1843); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTAMES,

§ 1.02(1)(a)(1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODE]. Deterrence, which is essentially
utilitarian in nature, has been criticized as violating the sanctity of the individual, by allowing
him to be used as an "object lesson." In theory, at least, any punishment can be sanctioned by a
deterrence rationale, since the punishment is inflicted not only because the offender merits it, but
because it serves the needs of society. See Dressier, supra note 173, at 1076.
171 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 175, at § 1.02(2)(b); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (West
1980). Professor Katkin points out that one of the early recidivist statutes in New York, the
Baume's Law, was enacted with the express purpose of deterring potential repeat offenders.
Katkin, supra note 12, at 104 (referring to Baume's Law, 1926 N.Y. Laws, ch. 457).
' Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (importance of reformation and rehabilitation as goals of criminal jurisprudence); see also MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 175, at §
1.02(2)(b); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.105(5). The rehabilitative model had its greatest vogue among
penologists in this country following the publication of an influential work by Radzinowitcz &
Turner, A Study of Punishment I: Introductory Essay, 21 CANADIAN B. REV. 91 (1943). In recent
years, however, there has been a general disenchantment with rehabilitation. While still recognizing it as the ideal, many penology experts now tend to reemphasize other goals, such as
deterrence. See generally F.A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL-PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1981).

1
1

See supra note 133.
See I. KANT, supra note 174, at 99.
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defendant has a propensity for crime.18 0 There is evidence to indicate
that recidivist statutes also are not effective as deterrents, especially
against serious offenders.' 8 ' Third, although habitual offender laws do
incapacitate criminals, studies indicate that they isolate only petty
offenders who constitute more of an annoyance than a danger to
society.182 Finaly, as with the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole totally rejects rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice
system.1 83 Many recidivists, like Helm, are social misfits, chronic alcoholics or drug abusers 184 for whom rehabilitation would be most
effective. This is the ultimate basis on which recidivist laws can be
attacked.
8 5
class, the Court could address their lack of procedural standards.1
Following the tack it took in Furman, the Court could require certain
safeguards which would allow for gradations of culpability among
habitual offenders. 8 6 Several possible methods are suggested by recidivist statutes currently in effect: require at least one violent crime
before a habitual offender statute can be applied; 87 prescribe a minimum sentence proportioned to the most recent offense and allow the
courts to impose additional punishment at their discretion; 188 key
punishment to the triggering offense by imposing a multiple of the
sentence provided for that crime, or the sentence plus a fixed term of
years; 18 9 or put a cap on the possible enhancement. 19 0 Any one of these
methods would provide some measure of protection for a defendant
like Helm, and would at least preclude the most egregious kinds of
disproportionality that can now take place under recidivist statutes.
Further clarification of this area could come about if the Court
overrules Rummel and either (1) permits review of all prison sentences
180Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284.
8I Several studies are cited by Professor Katkin, among them P. TAPPAN, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1952); D. WEST, THE HABITUAL PRISONER 13-14 (1963); Lynch, Parole

and the HabitualCriminal, 13 McGILL L.J. 632, 638 (1967).
182Katkin, supra note 12, at 99, 106-08.
183 Even Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Helm, rejects the policy of
"lock them up and throw the keys away." Burger, Our Options Are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV.
165 (1972).
184Katkin, supra note 12, at 106-08; see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 515, 562 (1968) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
I's See Katkin, supra note 12, at 117-18; Lynch, supra note 181, at 633; Note, supra note 12,
at 358.
188 Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
187 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (West 1972 & Supp. 1983).
188 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 747.1, 902.8-9 (West 1956 & Supp. 1980).
189 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
180 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976) (enhancement not to exceed 25 years and proportionate to

maximum term which can be imposed for underlying offense.).
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to ascertain their proportionality, or (2) limits such review to life
sentences. The rejection of Rummel would end the validation and
invalidation of life sentences for habitual offenders based on meaningless distinctions, such as the opportunity for parole, and would establish clear standards for eighth amendment adjudication in noncapital
cases. Moreover, the objections which have been raised against the
abandonment of the Rummel rationale are not meritorious.",' One
objection voiced by the Helm dissent, which believed that the Helm
majority was ignoring Rummel, was that the Court should be bound
by stare decisis.' 92 Although precedent is a valid and time-honored
consideration in guiding judicial decisions, it is not an "inexorable
command. 1 9 3 Every major judicial innovation is by definition a break
with earlier rulings. Moreover, when a constitutional issue is involved,
the Court has explicitly stated that it need not adhere rigidly to stare
9 4

decisis. 1

Another objection to the overruling of Rummel is that by undertaking a review of the proportionality of sentences, the Court would
overstep its proper role and invade the province of the legislature. The
Helm majority, in distinguishing Rummel and invalidating the sentence, denied any interference with legislative prerogative since the
Court was not attempting to set a specific sentence for Helm, but
rather to evaluate whether the sentence imposed was within constitutional limits.1 9 5 Legislative prerogative in any case does not preclude

judicial review, since, as Justice Brennan stated in Furman: "Judicial

"' These objections are duly noted by the Helm dissent. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text: supra note 154.
"2 Chief Justice Burger accused the majority of -blithely discard[ing] any' concept of *stare
decisis.' " Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This is only one example of the willingness of
the Court to overturn its previous decisions when it feels an important issue is at stake, or the
time is ripe for change. While this is not common practice, and the Court prefers to distinguish
rather than overrule prior holdings, it does occur in all areas of the law, substantive as well as
procedural. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 1000 (1941), wherein the Court expanded the federal government's reach under the commerce clause by explicitly overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968) by construing section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as creating a cause of action
against a party who refused to sell real property to blacks, despite an earlier case, Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), which held that Congress lacked power to legislate against
private racial discrimination.
194 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 451 U.S. 537 (1981); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S.
633 (1976); United States v. Smith Buffalo, 333 U.S. 771, 774-75 (1947). Even the citation used
by Chief Justice Burger in support of his position, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). acknowledged that stare dectisi is "perhaps never
entirely persuasive on a constitutional question." City of Akron. 103 S. Ct. at 2487.
195 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009-10.

1031

NOTES

1984]

enforcement of the Clause [prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment] cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures
have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely
the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights.""' In the end, as is
true in many areas of the law, a balance must be struck between the
province of the legislature and the responsibility of the judiciary. 7
One method might be to presume the constitutionality of recidivist
statutes, subject to rebuttal through judicial review.
The rejection of Rummel could permit the Court to review all
prison sentences to determine their proportionality. Appellate review
of sentencing has been a regular practice in England for most of this
century.9 8 Sentiment in favor of adopting the English procedure is
growing in this country, so that now more than half of the states
permit review of sentences in some circumstances. 9 9 This option has
the merit of leaving a duly enacted statute intact, so that interference
with legislative prerogative is limited only to those instances in which
the punishment prescribed is disproportionate to the particular offender and his offense, and thus is in contravention of the eighth
amendment 200

"I Furman, 408 U.S. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring.) Justice Brennan continued: The very
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. Id.
197 Professor Radin advocates a "risk of error principle" as a means of achieving this balance.
She says:
In a case involving individual interests, if it is preferable to risk error on the side of
the government, then a deferential stance is proper: if it is preferable to risk error on
the side of the individual, then an activist stance is called for . . . When crucial
individual interests are at stake, many of which are enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
our system recognizes that it is often better to risk error on the side of the individual.
Radin, supra note 173, at 1020-21.
' See Meador, The Review of Criminal Sentences in England (1965), published in A.B.A.
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REVIEW OF SENTENCES, APPENDIX C,
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94 (1967).

1.2 commentary at § 20.7, § 20.14-16 (2d ed. 1980). It is interesting to note that at the Virginia
convention, Patrick Henry advocated a kind of appellate review of sentences. Commenting on
Congress' power to define crimes and set punishments, he said, "'But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." 3 J.
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 447 (2d ed. 1876), quoted in Clapp, s-upra note 2. at 272.
20 One commentator argues that this does not constitute interference at all: rather, supervision over the lower courts "'serves to further legislatively chosen goals, and any precedential effect
of a decision is subject to legislative correction in future cases.- Note. Disproportionalityin
Sentences oJImprisonmen t, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1120 n.6 (1979). By contrast, if the Court
invalidates a statute, the legislatures have no recourse short of a constitutional amendment. Id.
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Rather than subject all prison sentences to appellate review,
however, the Court could overrule Rummel and limit its scope of
review to life sentences. This more moderate approach would entail
moving the "bright line" that the Court has drawn between the death
penalty and all other punishments to include sentences of life imprisonment as well. In Furman the Court determined that because the
death penalty is unique, protective measures aimed at eliminating
arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory imposition of the ultimate
punishment must be applied. 20 1 Drawing a new "bright line" would
involve application of the same kind of precautionary procedures that
20 2
are now used in capital cases.
The time has come to make these requirements applicable to the
administration of life imprisonment. It is clear that a sentence such as
Helm's, life imprisonment without parole, is analogous to the death
sentence in that it approaches the irrevocability of the latter. 20 3 But a
strong argument can be made that every life sentence, just like every
death sentence, is different from any other mode of punishment. In
many jurisdictions, life imprisonment in fact now stands in the place
where the death sentence stood earlier in this century: it is the most
severe punishment which the law provides. 20 4 As such, it should be
reserved for the most serious and abhorrent crimes. Even where the
death penalty is still in force, imprisonment for life is the penultimate
penalty. To use it to punish trivial, albeit repetitive, offenses is inimi20 5
cal to the idea of "evolving standards of decency.
The Court frequently is called upon to make difficult and complex evaluations. The decision in Helm, although narrow and tentative, opened the door which Rummel had closed. In the future,
however, the Court must face the issue of cruel and unusual punish-

201 Furman, 408 U.S. at 238; see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,

428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
202The procedures now generally required in capital cases include evaluation of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and a bifurcated trial. These, or similar procedures, could be
adopted before a life sentence is imposed. Under such a scheme, a defendant's recidivism might
be considered as one factor among many in evaluating whether life imprisonment was appropriate.
203 Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3013.
204 Hale v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (4th Cir. 1976); Wood v. South Carolina, 483

F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973). It should be noted that 36 states currently allow for capital punishment, and that there is a decided trend toward the reimposition of the death penalty in many
jurisdictions. See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S.Ct. 871 (1984).
205Packer, supra note 47, at 1081. Aside from the constitutional consideration, imposing life
sentences on petty criminals is not a practical course of action. It is too costly, and there are
simply not enough prisons to hold all the Helms and Rummels.
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ment as it relates to habitual offender laws directly and set clear
contemporary standards for adjudicating such cases which are consistent with the mandate of the eighth amendment.
Sylvia Orenstein

